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THE EFFECTS OF COLLUSION AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
ON THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 
ABSTRACT 
111 
In the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, developing countries (DCs) were adamant that in order to 
protect the environment for the future, new institutions were needed which would channel resources 
from the wealthy developed countries to the poor DCs. With this backdrop, I analyze the problem 
faced by an imperfectly informed supra-national govermuental authority (SNGA) with limited 
financial resources which wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (lEA). The 
SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various DCs; it must deal with such firms 
through their governments. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction and focus on the properties 
of the optimal limited liability lEA, which can be implemented by the SNGA when governments and 
firms in the individual DCs collude. I show that obtaining voluntary participation and preventing 
ex post breach of contract is costly for the SNGA. Further, because the optimal lEA satisfies budget 
balance, the level and pattern of pollution abatement is typically not ideal. My analysis suggests that 
lEAs are not inherently doomed due to a basic monitoring and enforcement problem arising from 
national sovereignty. However, the success of lEAs is fundamentally contingent on the funds 
available for environmental protection. 
JEL Classification: Q25, H77, D82 
Key words: international environmental agreement, developing country, limited liability 
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THE EFFECTS OF COLLUSION AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
ON THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES} 
1. Introduction 
With the passage of time, it has increasingly been recognized that environmental protection 
is an international issue. As noted by Bernauer (1995, p. 354), the scope and significance of this 
issue have been amply demonstrated by the events of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. At this 
Summit, it became clear that if the developed countries of the world wanted " ... the environment 
to be secured for future generations, [then they would] have to radically assist the South in choosing 
a different road to development than the one they [had] currently [been] traveling on" (Rogers 1993, 
p. 27). Indeed, to combat the twin evils of poverty and environmental degradation, developing 
countries (Des) have demanded the transfer of resources and technology from developed countries. 
In such a contentious setting, the success or failure to protect the environment will depend crucially 
on the ability of international institutions to craft effective international environmental agreements 
(IEAs).2 Given this, a key question becomes "How can international institutions, which necessarily 
respect the principle of state sovereignty, contribute to the solution of difficult global problems?" 
(Keohane, Haas, and Levy 1993, p. 6). This is the central question that I propose to analyze in this 
paper. 
II acknowledge financial support from the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan, 
UT 84322-4810, by way of project UTA 024. This paper has benefitted from the comments of seminar participants at 
the College of William and Mary and at the University of California, Berkeley. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2In this paper I shall use the terms lEA and contract interchangeably. 
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On the academic front, researchers have begun to study Issues relating to global 
environmental protection in a systematic manner only very recently.3 As a result, many specific 
questions remain unanswered. What kinds of pollution abatement patterns can one expect to observe 
in economic environments in which an imperfectly informed supranational governmental authority 
(SNGA) contracts with governments and polluting firms in individual DCs? What kinds of 
monetary transfers will be needed to get sovereign nations to voluntarily participate in an lEA? 
What can the SNGA do to prevent sovereign nations from breaching contracts they had agreed to 
ex ante?4 How does the SNGA's inability to monitor pollution abatement in the individual countries 
affect the contract design question? Finally, how does the limited availability of funds affect the 
SNGA's lEA design question? These are the specific questions that I shall answer in this paper. 
Although my analysis is, in principle, applicable to any country, the hierarchical interaction 
that I shall analyze is particularly relevant to DCs; consequently, the reader should note that it is 
these countries that I have in mind in all of the subsequent analysis. 5 I now discuss the nascent 
literature on lEAs and then move on to discuss my model in detail. 
3See Bernauer (1995), and Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1993) for a more detailed corroboration of this claim. 
4By ex ante I mean contracting which takes place with all parties holding symmetric but imperfect information 
about the quality of the pollution abatement technology offrrms. By ex post I mean contracting which takes place with 
the players holding asymmetric information about the quality of the pollution abatement technology ofthe same frrms. 
5The countries I have in mind are those that would be eligible to receive monetary transfers under the Global 
Environmental Facility' s (GEF) standard of per capita income of $4,000 or less. For more details, see Rogers (1993, 
p. 155). 
I 
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2. International Environmental Agreements: 
A Brief Synopsis 
Barrett (1992; 1994) has modeled lEAs as games between different countries. While 
Barrett ' s analyses are not in the design framework, Barrett makes the important point that for lEAs 
to work, they must be self-enforcing. However, the thrust of this point is weakened by Barrett's 
focus on identical countries, with no uncertainty. As a result, this line of research is unable to 
address fundamental questions arising from imperfectly held information and the heterogeneity of 
the contracting countries. 
Hoe1 (1991; 1992) addresses the implications of, in turn, unilateral emissions reduction by 
countries, and uniform emissions reduction by all countries. Hoel (1991, p. 69) shows that unilateral 
actions" ... may ... reduce global welfare ... " by increasing the total emissions of pollutants. Hoel 
(1992) argues against the institution of uniform emissions reduction policies in international 
agreements, showing that other policies yield higher levels of global welfare. 
Shogren, Baik, and Crocker (1992, SBC), Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993, BLD), and 
Sandler and Sargent (1995, SS) have all addressed the question of the minimal number of countries 
needed to sustain an lEA. In a multiplayer strategic setting, SBC show that countries will sometimes 
join lEAs because the expected gains from such an action outweigh the gains from not joining. 
However, beyond a critical threshold value, some countries will prefer to free ride and not join the 
lEA, whereas the lEA members will want nonparticipants to join. BLD have explored this notion 
of a threshold value, which they call "the optimal ratification level." BLD show that this level is 
reasonably robust to variations in contractual circumstances; more significantly, BLD argue that the 
prospects for effecting an lEA are not necessarily diminished by there being a large number of 
/ 
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countries. SS (1995, p. 152) show that the attainment of international coordination by a 
"minimal-sized group" is fundamentally dependent on " ... how individual pollution activities add 
to the total pollutants experienced ... [by nations]." While these papers have certainly advanced our 
understanding of some aspects of" ... the multi-faceted design ... problem," (BLD, p. 281), many 
other important questions-which I discussed in section I-remain unanswered. Consequently, I 
now discuss my modeling approach to the IEA design question. 
Recall that my principal objective is to study the efficacy of international institutions in 
solving global environmental problems. To this end, I shall model the international environment as 
a multiforked, three-tiered hierarchy. Occupying the topmost tier of the hierarchy is the relevant 
international institution or SNGA. This SNGA could be an organization like the World Bank,6 or 
the Commission on Sustainable Development created in Agenda 21 at the Rio Earth Summit. The 
second and third tiers of the hierarchy consist of the government and a representative polluting firm 
in each DC. Each fork of the hierarchy corresponds to a single DC, and there are N such countries.7 
Three-tiered hierarchies have been studied by Tirole (1986; 1988), by Kofman and Lawarree 
(1993), and by Batabyal (1996a; 1996b). These researchers have studied the contractual effects of 
collusion between the various players in their three-tiered hierarchies. However, to the best of my 
knowledge, the problem of designing budget balanced, limited liability contracts in a hierarchical 
international setting has not been studied to date. 
6Specifically in its role as an administrator of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). 
7The reader will note that in this modeling scheme, I have conferred on the SNGA, the role of principal. 
Consequently, there is a distinct asymmetry in the assumed power of the SNGA as opposed to that of governments and 
firms . Given that I am interested in DCs, which typically have limited bargaining power in their dealings with 
international organizations owing to the fact that their monetary contributions to the budgets of such organizations are 
minimal, this hierarchical modeling scheme appears to be appropriate. For more on the power of SNGAs over DCs, 
see Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1991). 
./ 
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As such, I shall build on and apply the theory ofhierarchies to study ex ante, limited liability 
contracting between the SNGA, national governments, and polluting firms in the various DCs. By 
limited liability I mean contracts that impose limits on the maximum ex post loss that governments 
and firms in the individual DCs can be forced to bear as a result of pollution abatement in adverse 
states of nature. This feature of the lEA that I shall study would appear to be relevant because 
international institutions generally cannot guarantee that there will be no ex post breach of contract 
by nations. The rationale for the actual contracting stems from issues including, but not limited to, 
the harmful atmospheric effects of sulphur and/or nitrogen emissions. The incidence of pollution 
may be domestic or transboundary.8 The key element of uncertainty stems from the SNGA's lack 
of knowledge about the quality of the pollution abatement technology available in each country. 
Whereas the firm in the DC always knows the quality of its technology and the government does in 
some states of nature, the SNGA is never privy to this information. The random variable denoting 
the private information about pollution abatement technology quality is uncorrelated across 
countries. This rules out the possibility of the SNGA engaging in relative performance evaluation. 
Because most DCs are very heterogeneous, and because it is unlikely that a SNGA would want to 
design contracts involving relative performance evaluation, this assumption of uncorrelatedness 
appears not to be restrictive. 9 In other words, my analysis holds for any finite set of countries, with 
the SNGAIgovernment/firm interaction in one country being independent of the SNGA's dealings 
with some other country. Consequently, without loss of generality, I shall focus on an arbitrary 
country, say country j, in the finite set of countries. The SNGA's task is to design a limited liability 
8See Crane (1993) and Paarlberg (1993) for a discussion of the relevance of international institutions when the 
incidence of an environmental externality is domestic. 
9Batabyal (1996c) has analyzed contracting with relative performance evaluation. 
./ 
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lEA which is incentive compatible, collusion-proof, and which will lead to optimal pollution 
abatement in country j. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3, I describe the model in detail and 
I study the properties of the first best optimum. In section 4, I study the above-described three-tiered 
hierarchy in which governments and firms within a DC may collude to the detriment of the SNGA. 
In particular, I analyze an ex ante, limited liability contract, which can be implemented by the SNGA 
in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Finally in section 5, I summarize the salient findings of this paper. 
The reasons for wanting to study collusion between the polluting firm and the DC 
government are threefold. First, while the DC government participates in the lEA because it 
recognizes the value of such international participation, this government also acts as the polluting 
firm's advocate. This aspect of the problem will give rise to scenarios in which government/firm 
collusion becomes a desirable option. Io Second, the government and the firm receive monetary 
transfers from the SNGA for their roles in abating pollution. I I Further, both these players know that 
the SNGA cannot monitor their activities owing to sovereignty. Consequently, there will be 
circumstances in which there are incentives for the government and the firm in each country to 
collude to maximize the transfers received from the SNGA. Third, as Mookherjee and Png (1995) 
noted, corruption is an endemic part of public life in many DCs. This suggests a need for explicitly 
modeling the activities of potentially corruptible players. Due to these three reasons, an important 
part of this paper will consist of analyzing a collusion-proof lEA. 
!OSee Peterson (1993) for a discussion of some practical instances of possible government/fIrm collusion in an 
international setting. 
" The exact nature of these roles is described in section 3a. 
J 
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3. The Theoretical Framework 
3a. Description of the Model 
Subscript i = 1,2,3,4 will refer to the state of nature, and superscript j = 1, ... , N will refer 
to the country. Let 8 denote the uncertainty about the quality of the abatement technology that is 
currently available; 8 has binary support [8L, 8H], where 0 < 8L < 8H , and.d8 == 8H - 8L . I shall 
refer to 8L as the low abatement quality parameter and to 8H as the high abatement quality parameter. 
The risk-averse firm produces clean air, whose output and value are denoted by 
x = a + 8, XElR . The firm chooses pollution abatement aElR , and the firm's cost of abatement 
+ ++ 
is g( a), where g 1(.) > 0, g It·) > 0, and g(O) = O. This firm has a differentiable net payoff from 
abatement function B[ T. - g( a .)] with BB [. ]/BT.E( 0, 00), \IT.. T .ElR is the state i monetary 
I I I I I + 
transfer made by the SNGA to the firm for abating pollution. The firm's reservation payoff is 
B = B [T ], and 1',. is the reservation transfer. Br and Tr are common knowledge. 
r r 
The DC government is risk-averse. It has a strictly concave and differentiable utility function 
V( G.), where G.E lR is the state i monetary transfer made by the SNGA to the government for its 
I I + 
role in participating in the lEA. The government's reservation utility is V = V( G ), where G ElR 
r r r + 
is the reservation transfer, and V I(G .) E (0, 00), \lG .. By employing a monitoring device, the 
I I 
government receives a signal s, from the firm regarding its private information and then it sends a 
report r to the SNGA, indicating what it observed about the firm's pollution abatement technology 
quality parameter. 12 In some states of nature, this monitoring device malfunctions and, hence, in 
these states, the government will be unable to provide the SNGA with an useful report. Upon 
12Since the main objective of this paper is not to study domestic monitoring, I shall assume that the use of this 
monitoring device is costless. 
8 
receiving r, the SNGA offers the government a transfer G .ElR . The reader should note that making 
l + 
reporting a key government function is consistent with the government/SNGA interaction proposed 
for one specific SNGA, namely, the Commission on Sustainable Development. As noted by Rogers 
(1993, p. 310), a key aspect of this interaction involves the " ... Commission's ... considering 
information provided by governments .... " 
The SNGA is risk-neutral, and it has a welfare function defined over clean air, which takes 
the form U = .L:.( a i + 8/ - G i - T i), j = 1, ... , N, where the index j runs over N, the total number 
} 
of countries. The quantity of clean air produced by the firm in country j is xi = a i + 8/. As stated, 
the SNGA's welfare is the difference between total clean air production and the sum of government 
and firm transfers. In what follows, when there is no cause for confusion, I shall suppress the 
country superscript; the analysis will focus on country j. The SNGA designs the lEA, which it offers 
to the government and the firm. The contract can only be conditioned on what the SNGA actually 
observes, i.e., the government's report r, and the firm's production of clean air X.13 
There are four states of nature, each state occurring with probability p . > 0, where 
l 
.L: \;1 Pi = 1. The SNGA, the government, and the firm sign the lEA holding symmetric but imperfect 
information about 8. The firm always observes 8 before choosing its abatement level. The 
government, on the other hand, mayor may not observe the firm's private information. This 
depends on whether the government's monitoring device functions or malfunctions. In other words, 
the government's signal s, mayor may not be informative. I can now characterize the four states: 
* State 1: The firm and the government both observe 8L . 
131 do not discuss the manner in which the SNGA raises revenue. One possibility would be to conform to the 
text of Agenda 21. According to this document, developed countries are supposed to contribute 0.7% of their GNP for 
the purpose of environmental protection. For more details, see Rogers (1993, pp. 151-60). 
/ 
* State 2: The firm observes 8L and the government observes nothing. 
* State 3: The firm observes 8H and the government observes nothing. 
* State 4: The firm and the government both observe 8H . 
9 
In state 1, the firm and the government both observe the low abatement technology quality 
parameter. The government's monitoring device works and, hence, yields useful information. In 
state 2, the firm observes the low abatement technology quality parameter but the government 
observes nothing. In this state, the government's monitoring device malfunctions. In state 3, the 
firm observes the high abatement technology quality parameter, and, once again, the government's 
monitoring device malfunctions. Finally in state 4, the firm and the government observe the high 
abatement technology quality parameter. 
The timing of the game between the SNGA, the government, and the firm is as follows. 
First, the SNGA offers a contract to the government and the firm. Second, the firm observes the 
actual realization of8 and the government receives its signal s. Third, the firm chooses a. Fourth, 
clean air x is produced by the firm, and the government sends its report r to the SNGA, indicating 
what it observed. Fifth, the SNGA compensates the government and the firm with transfers G(x, r) 
and T(x, r). In this paper, I shall analyze zero liability contracts. In such contracts, the SNGA must 
compensate governments and firms with transfers equal in magnitude to the government reservation 
utility and the firm reservation payoff, respectively. Alternately put, in such contracts, governments 
and firms have the right to disassociate themselves from their ex ante contractual obligations without 
any penalty, once they have acquired their private information. For most practical situations, this 
zero liability restriction is without loss of generality. Indeed, my subsequent analysis will remain 
/ 
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unaltered qualitatively as long as the magnitudes of the government and firm liabilities-LG andLF, 
respectively-are less than the government reservation utility, and the firm reservation payoff. 14 
In the remainder of this paper I shall assume that the SNGA can verify the veracity of the 
government's report r. In other words, if the government's signal s is noninformative, then the 
corresponding report r reflects this fact, and the SNGA can verify that the true facts are indeed as 
they have been reported. In symbols, s = 0 = r = O. On the other hand, to keep the SNGA's 
design problem interesting and to allow for the possibility of government/firm collusion, I permit 
the government to lie and report that its signal is noninformative when in fact such is not the case. IS 
That is, s = e = rE {e, O}. This completes the description of my model. I now consider the 
benchmark case in which perfect information is acquired by the SNGA. 
3b. The First-Best Optimum 
In this case, the SNGA observes e and the firm's pollution abatement choice. When this 
happens, the SNGA bypasses the government and contracts with the firm directly. The government 
receives its reservation transfer, G,., and, hence, its reservation utility, V;., in all states. The SNGA 
solves 
max .~ {a! + EY: - gi(a!) - Ti - Gi} 
at bj I I I r r' (A) 
14In a two-tiered hierarchy, Sappington (1983, pp. 15 -7) discusses how zero liability contracts would be altered 
by restrictions in which a player's liability exceeds his reservation utility. 
lSThe reader will note that I have restricted the government's message space in certain states. Specifically, the 
government can lie only in states 1 and 4. The government can also announce the wrong state, but in my setup, this is 
equivalent to obtaining a noninformative signal. While in principle this restriction can be relaxed by allowing for an 
expanded range of governmental reporting options, from a practical standpoint, such an action would make it 
exceedingly difficult to obtain concrete results. This is because relaxing the above restriction would lead to an increased 
number of states and, hence, to more constraints on the SNGA's overall optimization problem. 
/ 
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subject to (AI) ~ ~ pB[T. - g(a .)] ~ B, (A2) B[T. - g(a .)] ~ LF , Vi, and (A3) V I I I I r I I 
M ~ ~ {Ti + gi(a!) + Gi}. Because I am analyzing a zero liability contract, B = L
F
, and, 
'Ilj r I r r 
hence, the firm's ex ante participation constraint (AI) can be ignored. Now using the fact that the 
zero liability constraints in (A2) bind, the first-order necessary conditions are 
dg i ( a )/da! = lI( 1 + y), Vi, j, where y is the multiplier on the budget balance constraint (A3) 
* I 
and a is the first-best level of pollution abatement. We see that in the first-best optimum, the 
* 
marginal cost of pollution abatement in country j is set equal to the reciprocal of one plus the 
marginal welfare of the SNGA's funds. The optimal level of abatement a * is independent of the 
state; consequently, the firm's transfer for abating pollution is also independent of the state. This 
transfer equals T + g , where Tr is the reservation transfer and g == g( a ). 
r * * * 
It is not possible to determine whether the SNGA's budget constraint binds in equilibrium. 
/ 
To see why not, note the following. The SNGA's welfare function exhibits constant marginal 
welfare in the authority's own funds. As opposed to this, the funds spent making transfers do not 
exhibit constant marginal welfare. As a result, it is possible that, in equilibrium, the SNGA will 
disburse only a part of M because the effect of such disbursement on clean air production drops 
below one before the SNGA exhausts M. The second case in which the SNGA exhausts M before 
the effect on clean air production drops below one is also possible. Which case will prevail depends 
on the curvatures of the Bi[.], and particularly the gi(.) functions. In the rest of this paper I shall 
assume that the curvatures of these two functions are such that the budget constraints bind in 
equilibrium. From a practical standpoint, this is the relevant case. I now discuss the more 
interesting case in which the DC government and the firm may collude, and the SNGA cannot 
observe e or the actual abatement undertaken by the firm. 
12 
4. The Effects of Collusion and Limited Liability 
Recall that because countries are sovereign, the SNGA is unable to either monitor the actions 
of the government and the firm or enforce the terms of the lEA in the event of a contractual breach. 
Since the SNGA can never acquire the firm ' s private information and must rely on the government's 
report to design the optimal contract, an efficient zero liability contract must not only be individually 
rational and incentive compatible, but it must be collusion-proof as well. 16 
I shall model collusion between the government and the firm as follows. Before the 
resolution of the uncertainty regarding abatement technology quality and at the time of signing the 
main contract, i.e., the SNGAIgovernment/firm contract, the firm and the government sign a 
secondary contract, which entails the offer and acceptance of a bribe from the firm to its government. 
Naturally, this secondary contract is unobservable by the SNGA. The bribe b(·, .), is a function 
of what the firm and the government both observe, i.e., the government's report r, and clean air x. 
With the offer and acceptance of this bribe, the firm's total transfer becomes {T(·) - b (r, x)} and 
the government's total transfer becomes {G ( .) + b (r , x) }. I shall not be concerned with the 
question of how the surplus from the bribe is divided. For my purpose, it is only necessary to 
stipulate that the bribe is actually paid by the firm to its government. To see why the firm might 
want to bribe its government in my four-state world, consider state 4. In state 4, the government is 
indifferent between reporting that it has observed 8H and reporting that it has observed O. However, 
the firm would prefer that the government report O. This is one instance in which a clear rationale 
exists for the firm to bribe its government. 17 
16Also see footnote 10. 
17 Also see the discussion in the last paragraph of section 2. 
/ 
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In order to formulate and solve the SNGA's problem when there is collusion, I shall follow 
Tirole (1986; 1988). Tirole's method involves imposing constraints in addition to the usual 
participation and incentive compatibility constraints. These additional constraints are designed to 
preclude government/firm collusion and, hence, make the main contract collusion-proof. 
Denote the collusion-proof transfers to the government and the firm by G and T, respectively. 
The SNGA solves 
- -
max{G f } ~ f7Z p .( a. + 8. - G. - T.) 
j' j ' a j I I I I I 
(B) 
- - -
subject to (A1)-(A2) with I: and Gi replaced with T. and G., (B1) ~ ~ p .V(G . ) ~ V, (B2) I I V I I I r 
- - - --
V(G) ~ L G , Vi, (B3) T3 - g(a3 ) ~ T2 - g(a2 - Ll8), (B4) T2 - g(a2 ) ~ T3 - g(a3 + Ll8), (B5) 
- - -- - - --
Gj + T j - g(aj ) ~ G2 + T2 - g(a2 ), (B6) G4 + T4 - g(a4 ) ~ G3 + T3 - g(a3 ), (B7) 
-- -- ----
G
3 
+ T3 - g(a3 ) ~ G2 + T2 - g(a2 - Ll8), (B8) G2 + T2 - g(a2 ) ~ G3 + T3 - g(a3 + Ll8), and / 
(B9) M ~ ~ f-h { a! + T!}, Vi. 
VJ I I 
The constraint (B 1) is the government's ex ante participation constraint. The four constraints 
in (B2) denote the government's zero liability constraints. These constraints can be interpreted as 
the maximum penalty that can be imposed on the government by the SNGA in the event that ex post, 
the government chooses to disassociate itself from its contractual obligations. Because I am 
studying zero liability contracts, Vr = LG and Br = L
F
. Constraints (B3) and (B4) are the firm's 
incentive compatibility constraints. Constraint (B3) says that in state 3, the firm should not claim 
that the state is actually 2. Similarly, (B4) tells us that in state 2, the firm should not claim that the 
state is actually 3. Note that these are also the states in which the government's signal s is 
noninformative. Constraints (B5) and (B6) are the core collusion constraints. Recall that in states 
1 and 4 the government's signal s is informative. In these two states, the government can hide this 
14 
fact. Given this, constraints (BS) and (B6) tell us that should the firm bribe its government, then the 
total sum of the transfers less the cost of pollution abatement in states 1 and 4 cannot be less than 
the corresponding totals in states 2 and 3, respectively. Constraint (B7) tells us that the government 
should not be able to bribe the firm in state 3 to abate at the level that is appropriate for state 2. 
Similarly, (B8) says that the government should not be able to bribe the firm to claim that the state 
is 3 when it is 2. Finally, (B9) denotes the SNGA's budget constraints. These constraints tell us that 
irrespective of state, the total sum of transfers paid to the government and the firm in the various 
countries cannot exceed the SNGA's available budget M for environmental protection. Solving the 
SNGA's problem (B) subject to (A1)-(A2) and (B1)-(B9), I get 
Theorem 1: The optimal zero liability contract when there is government/firm collusion is one in 
which (i) 
/ 
- - - -~ I. ~ I. ~ I. ~ I. 
A jg (a j) = A 3g (a 3) = A $ (a 4) > A p (a 2) , ( iii ) G4 > Gj = G2 = G3 = Gr , ( i v ) 
- - - -
T3 - g(a3) > T4 - g(a4) > Tj - g(aj ) = T2 - g(a2), and (v) at the optimum all the constraints except 
(AI), (A2, i = 1.2.3), (B 1), (B2, i = 4), (B4) and (B8) bind. I8 
Proof· See the Appendix. 
In order to intuitively verify that the above contract is collusion-proof, I have to show that 
constraints (AI )-(A2) and constraints (B 1 )-(B9) are satisfied. By part (v) of Theorem 1, constraints 
(A2, i = 1,2), (B2, i = 1,2,3), (B3), (BS), (B6), (B7) and (B9) are satisfied. The proof of Theorem 1 
tells us that constraints (AI), (A2, i = 3,4), (B1), (B2, i=4), (B4) and (B8) hold as strict inequalities. 
Thus the equilibrium contract is indeed collusion-proof. Let us now study this collusion-proof 
contract in greater detail. 
18For an exact representation of A and D, see the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix. 
I 
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First, part (i) of Theorem 1 tells us that the actual level of pollution abatement in any state 
is a function of the state probability p., and the multiplier on the budget constraint y .. Part (ii) tells 
1 1 
us that the optimal contract equalizes the weighted marginal cost of pollution abatement in states 1, 
3, and 4. 
weights. 19 Because the budget constraints bind in equilibrium, the contractually specified levels of 
abatement will generally not be ideal. In this connection, the reader should note that because the 
expression for the first-best level of abatement a in section 3b involves a multiplier y that is 
* 
specific to the first-best problem, no direct comparison of the optimal abatement levels across the 
two modeling scenarios can be made. 
Second, part (iii) of Theorem 1 tells us that the transfers to the DC government reflect the 
usefulness of the government's report to the SNGA. In particular, because the government's report 
/ 
- -
is noninformative to the SNGA in states 2 and 3, G
2 
= G
3 
= G
r 
holds. Further, in order to prevent 
collusion and to encourage the government to tell the truth in the high abatement technology quality 
- - - -
state 4, the SNGA offers G4 > G2 = G3 = G] = Gr' The government earns no informational rents 
in the low abatement technology quality state 1 because the SNGA is successful in inducing the 
government to reveal its private information truthfully at least cost. 
Third, parts (iv) and (v) of Theorem 1 tell us that at the optimum, the firm and the 
government liability constraints bind more often than not. This means that the optimal contract 
offered by the SNGA must respect the fact that ex post, the firm and the government may choose to 
disassociate themselves from their contractual obligations in several states of nature. To see why 
these liability constraints do not bind in every state of nature, consider the firm liability constraints 
19See step 13 of the proof of Theorem 1 for an exact representation of these weights. 
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for states 3 and 4. The state 3 liability constraint is slack because the incentive compatibility 
constraint for this state binds at the optimum. This simply reflects the fact that in this high 
abatement technology quality state, the incentive compatibility constraint (B3) is always more 
restrictive than the liability constraint. Similarly in state 4, as compared to the liability constraint, 
the collusion incentive compatibility constraint (B6) is more pressing to the SNGA. In particular, 
in order to ensure that no collusion takes place in this high abatement technology quality state, the 
SNGA has to pay a premium to the firm. This is why the state 4 firm liability constraint is slack at 
the optimum. 
Note that as compared to the case in which the government and the firm do not collude, the 
SNGA is clearly worse off in this collusion case. This is because the possibility of government/firm 
collusion necessitates the inclusion of constraints (BS)-(B8). In other words, the number ofbinding 
constraints in the collusion case exceeds the number ofbinding constraints in the no collusion case. 
However, if the SNGA does indeed offer the contract with the characteristics described in 
Theorem 1, then its monetary obligations will be as described in the Theorem. The reader should 
note that the SNGA offers the best contract possible from the set of feasible, zero liability contracts 
that are constrained to be budget balancing and collusion-proof. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper I analyzed the question of environmental protection for developing countries 
within the framework of the directives set forth in the various agreements reached at the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit. I modeled the institutional setting for the underlying problem as a three-tiered 
hierarchy with N forks, and then I studied the effects of collusion and limited liability on the 
SNGA's lEA design problem. Four significant policy conclusions emerge. 
/ 
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First, the liability constraints for the government and the finn generally bind at the optimum. 
This means that from the perspective of the SNGA, it is costly to obtain voluntary participation by 
individual DCs and preventing ex post breach of contract. This notwithstanding, Barrett (1994) has 
argued that for lEAs to work, they must be self-enforcing. Along the same lines, Rogers (1993, 
p. 236) has worried that many of the Earth Summit directives " ... offer a back door option by which 
signatories can excuse themselves at a later date if the going gets too tough." The implementability 
of limited liability contracts of the sort analyzed in this paper should allay such concerns because 
a limited liability contract is self-enforcing. Put differently, as compared to an ex ante contract, a 
limited liability contract is more likely to be renegotiation-proof. 
Second, money matters. Although one cannot be certain that budgetary considerations will 
have a qualitative impact on the contractually specified pollution abatement levels, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that in any practical setting, such considerations will influence actual pollution 
abatement patterns by limiting the magnitude of the transfers that a SNGA can make. 
Third, the SNGA will prefer ex ante contracting to contracting with limited liability 
constraints. Because ex ante contracting involves optimization with fewer constraints, the SNGA's 
expected welfare with ex ante contracting will be higher than its expected welfare with limited 
liability contracting. However, in the context ofDCs, unless a SNGA can limit the ex post liability 
of the players, nations are unlikely to participate in ex ante contracting schemes. Further, ex ante 
contracting schemes will generally not be self-enforcing. 
Fourth, the SNGA can indeed circumvent the monitoring and enforcement problem stemming 
from national sovereignty by designing collusion-proof contracts. This tells us that the concerns of 
researchers like Krasner (1983) who have worried about the deleterious effects of sovereignty, are 
/ 
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somewhat misplaced. At least in the realm of international environmental affairs, the main 
impediments to the design of efficient lEA's appear to involve funds and informational 
imperfections. 
With talk of rising disparity between the South and the North and the increasingly 
acrimonious nature of international discussions regarding the use of environmental resources, the 
lEA design question studied in this paper takes on particular significance. This is in no small 
measure due to the fact that the implementation of such agreements will do more to engender and 
maintain international security than will most strategic or unilateral policy measures. 
/ 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 1: Because Br = LF and Vr = Lo' (AI) and (B1) are redundant and can be 
ignored. Omitting (B4) and (B8) temporarily, the Lagrangian is 
- - - -
~ = ~ . P .( x. - G. - T.) + ~ .ct. { B [ .] - LF } + ~.D . { V ( .) - La} + P {T3 - g ( .) - T2 + g ( • )} + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
- - - - - - --
E 1 { G 1 + T1 - g( .) - G 2 - T2 + g( • )} + E 2 { G 4 + T4 - g( .) - G 3 - T3 + g( • )} + 
K {03 + T3 - g( .) - 02 - T2 + g( • )} + ~.y . [Ai - ~. { O! + T!} ], 
II} 1 1 (b) 
where ct., D., p, E1, K, y ., i = 1,2,3,4, I = 1,2 are the multipliers associated with (A2), (B2), 1 1 1 
(B3), (BS), (B6), (B7), and (B9), respectively. The first-order necessary conditions are (b 1) 
D 1 V I( °1 ) = P 1 - E 1 + Y l' (b2) D 2 V t °2 ) = P 2 + E 1 + K + Y 2' (b3) D 3 V t °3 ) = P 3 + E 2 - K + Y 3' (b4) 
D 4Vt 04) = P 4 - E2 + Y 4' (b5)a l {aB [. ]/aTI } = PI - EI + Y I' (b6) ct2 {aB [. ]/aT2} = P2 + P + E 1 + K + Y 2' 
-
-(b 7) ct3 { aB [ • ]/aT3 } = P3 + E2 - P - K + Y 3' ( b 8 ) ct 4 { aB [ • ]/aT4 } = P 4 - E2 + Y 4' ( b 9 ) 
{ alB t·] + EI } g I( a l ) = PI' (b 1 0) { a2B t·] -EI } g I( a2 ) = P2 + {P + K}g I( a2 - il8), (b 11) 
{ ct3B t · ] + P - E2 + K } g I ( a3 ) = P 3' and (b 12) { ct 4B t · ] + E2 } g I ( a 4) = P 4 . 
Step 1: The budget constraints bind at the optimum. 
Proof' This result follows by assumption. Also see the related discussion in section 3b .• 
Step 2: The state 2 firm and government liability constraints bind at the optimum. 
Proof' Suppose ct2 =0. Then (b6) tells us that Y 2 = -(P2 +P +E I +K), which is impossible irrespective 
which is impossible irrespective of whether E I ~ 0 and K ~ O. Thus, D2 > O. • 
Step 3: The state 1 firm and government liability constraints bind at the optimum. 
.I 
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Proof' (bI) tells us that VI = EI = 0 is impossible. (bI) and (bS) tell us that either (i) (Xl = VI = 0 
or (ii) (X I > 0 and V I > O. If (I) holds, then (BS) is slack and E I = O. But this is impossible. Thus (X I > 0 
and VI >0 .• 
Step 4: The state 3 government liability constraint binds at the optimum. 
Proof' V3 = 0 ==? K = P3 + E2 + Y 3' Substituting this into (b7) I get (X3B t .] = -p. This equality holds 
only if (X3 = P = O. Clearly, the state 3 participation constraint and the incentive compatibility 
constraint cannot both be slack at the optimum. Thus V3 > O. • 
Step 5: (B3) binds at the optimum. 
Proof' Suppose p = O. Then (b3) and (b7) give (X3 > O. Using this in (B3) yields g(a2 -L18»g(a2). 
This is impossible. Thus p > O .• 
Step 6: The state 3 firm liability constraint is slack at the optimum. 
/ 
Proof' Clearly, (X3 = P = 0 and (X3 > 0, p > 0 are impossible. Suppose (X3 > 0 and p = O. Then 
-
T3 -g(a3) = Tr>Tr +g(a2)-g(a2 -L18)==?O>g(a2)-g(a2 -L18). This is impossible because L18 > O. I 
conclude that (X3 = 0, p > O .• 
Step 7: The state 4 firm and government liability constraints are slack at the optimum. 
Proof' (b4) and (b8) tell us that either (i) (X4> 0 and V 4> 0 or (ii) a4 = V 4 = O. If (i) holds, then 
(B6) is violated. Thus a 4 = V 4 = O. • 
- - - -
Step 8: G 4 > G I = G 2 = G 3 = Gr' 
Proof' This follows because V I > 0, V2 > 0, V3 > 0, and V 4 = O. • 
Step 9: (BS) and (B6) bind at the optimum. 
Proof' a l > 0, C(.2> 0, V3 > 0, v4> 0 tell us that EI > O. (b4) and v4 = 0 tell us that E2 > O .• 
- - - -
Step 10: T3 - g(a3»T4 - g(a4» TI - g(aI) = T2 - g(a2)· 
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Proof' This follows because cx
4 
= 0, cx
3 
= 0, u
3 
> 0, u
4 
= 0, E
2
> O .• 
Step 11: (B 7) binds at the optimum. 
- -
Proof' (B7) binds, i.e., K> 0, .,' P > 0 and G2 = G3 •• 
Step 12: For i*2, ai=(g /rl{p!(Pi+Yi)}' and "a2 =(g/r
l[{p/(P2+ y)}-D], where 
D = {p / (P 2 + Y 2) - g I ( a2 ) } . 
Proof' From (b5) and (b9) I get a l = (g Ir 
1 {p /(P 1 + Y 1) } . From (b6) and (b 1 0) I get 
a2 = (g I) -l[ {P/(P2 + Y 2)} - D]. From (b7) and (bll) I get a3 = (g ) -1 {P/(P3 + Y 3)}' Finally, from 
(b8) and (bI2) I get a4 = (g /r
l{p/(P4 +y4)} •• 
- I - I - I - I - . Step 13: Alg (a l ) =A3g (a3) =A4g (a4) > A2g (a2), where Ai = (Pi +Y)/Pi' 1 = 1, ... ,4. 
Proof' From the proof to Step 12, it followsthatA
2
g l(a2) < 1 =A1gI(al ) =A3gl(a3) =A4g
l(a4) .• 
I now check to see that (B4) and (B8) are satisfied. Suppose that 
g I > 0 and gil> 0, this last equality holds iff a
2 
> a
3
• However, a contract which requires that 
relative to state 3, there be more abatement in the low abatement technology quality state 2, cannot 
be optimal. Hence T2 - g( a2) > T3 - g( a3 +.d8). Intuitively, we know that for i = 2,3, either the 
incentive compatibility constraint binds or the participation constraint binds, but not both. For state 
3, the high abatement technology quality state, the incentive compatibility constraint binds; hence, 
the participation constraint is slack. As contrasted to this, in the low abatement technology quality 
state 2, the participation constraint binds; hence, the incentive compatibility constraint is slack. 
- -
Having shown that (B4) is satisfied, to verify that (B8) is satisfied, it suffices to note that G2 = G3 • 
This completes the proof of Theorem 1 . •• 
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